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Abstract
Capital and credit constraints limit the small farm’s ability to adequately use resources for optimum per-
formance. Farmers’ access to capital is constrained in multiple ways, including price factors, risk factors,
and transaction factors, as well as access to and ease of rural agricultural financing. Using a primary survey
data of small farms in Tennessee, we analyzed factors influencing credit constraint and its impact on farm
performance. Farm operators’ gender, off-farm work, land acreage holdings, farm specialization, and the
use of smart phone with Internet significantly influenced credit constraint. We found that the financial
performance of credit constrained small farmers was significantly lower than that of unconstrained small
farmers—an adverse impact of constrained capacity to credit could result in up to $51,000 lower in gross
farm sales. Additionally, our reason-specific results within credit constraint suggested that around $32,000
to $39,000 lower performance in gross sales can be attributable to the constrained borrowing with deficit to
obtain agricultural loans at required or desired level.
Keywords: Agricultural finance; constrained borrowing; credit constraint; financial performance; propensity score matching;
rural credit in America; small farms; Tennessee
JEL Classifications: D13; Q12; Q14; Q18
1. Introduction
Agriculture, in most cases, requires a significant start-up investment to begin operations as well as
to continue operations. Credit is one of the important factors in agriculture because it allows farm-
ers to have access to capital and meet their obligations as required during various stages of the
production cycle. Production in agriculture is peculiar to a production cycle involving a significant
time gap between the input use and the output produced due to the biological processes, which are
also subjected to whims of weather, pests, and diseases (Conning and Udry, 2005). In that, the
feasibility of financial markets could complement by generating value through loans characterized
by cash or goods exchange now with an undertaking of repayment in the future. This promise can
be backed up with added limitations, which define the rights and behavior of the parties involved.
However, this promise can occasionally be broken by the borrower. This imperfect information
(asymmetry) situation has financiers evaluating prospective borrowers in order to decide who is
likely to settle loans as promised. Financiers, on the other hand, follow up on which funds are used
in order to confirm that they are used for activities that guarantee loan payment (Dowd, 1992; Von
Pischke, 1991). From the farmers stand point, payment for materials and purchase of inputs such
as seeds, fertilizer, and labor should be met, in most cases, readily through cash, liquid assets, or
line of credit (if available) during the respective stages of preparation, planting, cultivation, and
harvesting. Note that these payments are required to be completed during times when limited or
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no income is earned from agriculture, while most cash income from farming is earned typically
after some time of crop harvest or livestock sale. In addition to the initial investment, farmers have
challenges to meet liquidity requirements in the production process during time lag between
planting and harvesting. However, with limited access to credit, the quantities and the combina-
tion of inputs used by the farmers might not be optimum, which may lead to suboptimal produc-
tivity and outcome. The marginal impact of sufficient credit, therefore, permits input level used to be
close to the best level, hence increasing performance and output (Feder et al., 1990). In addition,
agricultural financing is unique in that farming is a high-asset but low-income activity with rela-
tively low return on investments. Agricultural consolidation and structural changes have increased
the need for capital pushing farms to increase their sizes to maintain continued profitability.
It should be noted that agriculture is an important sector for rural economic development.
Access to credit enhances farmers’ abilities to adequately use resources in order to increase pro-
ductivity and to purchase inputs to expand the scale of operation (Adera, 1995; Akwaa-Sakyi,
2013). Ahma (2010) argues that access to credit allows the farmers to venture into new areas
of economic activities, increase their sources of capital, and manage risks associated with agricul-
ture. As important as access to credit is for farmers, a number of challenges embody the adequate
credit access at a competitive rate. Furthermore, lower return on investment causes limitations to
undertake profitable investments or to take maximum advantage of market opportunities leading
to reduced revenue and growth opportunities. High transaction costs attached to information
gathering, strict collateral requirement, and credit history are important constraints affecting
mostly small farmers as well as entrepreneurs (Boucher, Guirkinger, and Trivelli, 2009;
Fletschner, Guirkinger, and Boucher, 2010; Guirkinger, 2008; Guirkinger and Boucher, 2008).
While we find a large number of studies on credit and rural financial markets focused in the
context of developing countries, credit and rural financial problems are not an exception in devel-
oped countries. Blancard et al. (2006) found that credit and investment constraints were binding
on French farmers’ profit function—unconstrained farmers having access to financial markets
performed significantly better. Moreover, in various studies analyzing U.S. agricultural finance
context, scholars have found binding financial constraints on production and profit, such as, bind-
ing credit constraints (Lee and Chambers, 1986), binding cash flow constraints among New York
dairy farmers (Tauer and Kaiser, 1988), binding credit constraints for some sampled California
rice growers (Färe, Grosskopf, and Lee, 1990), and assets and debt constraints (Whittaker and
Morehart, 1991). In a recent study, specifically analyzing new farmers’ data from Alabama,
Hartarska and Nadolnyak (2012) found evidence that the new farmers (those initiating operations
after 2005) were significantly financially constrained. Moreover, Briggeman, Towe, and Morehart
(2009) showed that production is lower by 3% in credit constrained farmers compared to credit
unconstrained farmers in the United States.
Even though external financing is very common among farmers, there are several factors that
hinder these farmers from obtaining finance. One important factor is the cost of external financing
due to capital market imperfections as a result of information asymmetry between borrowers and
lenders (Girante, Goodwin, and Featherstone, 2008)—transaction cost can also come in the form
of loan application preparation, value of collateral evaluation, or credit use monitoring all of which
can increase the overall cost of borrowing and can result in a wedge between effective interest rate
and contracted interest rate. Also, the farmers may be afraid of losing their collateral as a result of
the risky nature of the industry, hence they get discouraged from getting credit, even though the
credit is needed and the market rate is favorable (Carter, 1988). An increase in interest rate result-
ing from an increase in demand for credit and imbalanced supply could also make some farmers
credit constrained (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981). Other factors may include the lack of assets used for
collateral (Boucher, Guirkinger, and Trivelli, 2009), the limited supply of capital market, inade-
quate institutions to offer credit services, and demographic characteristics such as the education
level of farmers.
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Access to credit and financial markets play an important role in rural American farmers’ per-
formance. Potential growth and development of rural areas in the United States have shown to
have significantly strong links between agricultural lending (Hartarska, Nadolnyak, and Shen,
2015; Johnson, 2009). However, access to credit and proper functioning rural financial markets
continues to be an issue, affecting new farmers and land values in the United States (Hartarska and
Nadolnyak, 2012; Mishra, Moss, and Erickson, 2008).
Reviewing historical perspectives and genesis of America’s farm credit system specifically in
rural areas, Turvey (2017, p. 17) writes “spillover effects from the liberalization of financial mar-
kets has not, in many jurisdictions, provided the required spillover effects for institutional devel-
opment in rural areas. Binding liquidity constraints limit farm profitability and investment, and
even when there is access to credit collateral risk and risk-rationing can limit demand”; “despite
great progress in developing capital markets, the promised development of institutional capacity
and spillover effects into increased access and use of credit has not materialized in many
jurisdictions.”
Moreover, there is also segmentation in the rural financial market (Nadolnyak, Shen, and
Hartarska, 2017). The major financial institutions—Farm Credit System (FCS) and commercial
banks are considered the major lenders for agricultural loans in the United States—tend to serve
well-equipped farmers with a high degree of credibility, while farmers with lower incomes with
low-collateral ability face significant challenges. Bank market structure in the United States has
been characterized by consolidation and mergers, where a limited number of financial institutions
dominate the market; there are fewer and larger banks and FCS institutions (Dodson and
Ahrendsen, 2017). Discussing the two parallel facts: (1) higher profitability of banks who are pro-
viding farm loans and (2) the higher demand for agricultural credit in farm-dependent counties
possibly crowding out nonfarm demands, Kilkenny and Jolly (2005) postulate that banks provid-
ing farm credit may engage in credit rationing towards farmers and away from nonfarm bor-
rowers. Commercial lenders focus on lending to larger commercial farms. Many smaller farms
face difficulties as loan sizes requested by small farms may not be economical for commercial
lenders. In this regard, Dodson and Ahrendsen (2016) discussed debt usage by small and large
farmers, particularly noting that there has been a significant drop in debt held by farms with less
than $100,000 in production (a drop by 10% between 1996 and 2014), while debt held by larger
farms with more than 2 million in production increased significantly (around 20% between 1996
and 2014). Medium- and large-scale farmers have greater flexibility in regards to medium- and
long-term credit financing, however making long-term investments by small farmers and entre-
preneurs is usually very rare. This may prevent small farms from an introduction to new tech-
nologies, modernization of equipment, and provision of greater opportunities for profit, leading to
inhibited growth and productivity. The Farm Service Agency (FSA)’s direct and guaranteed loans
aimed at a specific class of borrowers has served small farms and farms with temporary financial
difficulties to some extent through direct loans (Dodson and Ahrendsen, 2017). However, full
functionality and sustainability of these direct programs to meet increased loan demands of small
farms is debatable at least from two viewpoints—first, in the face of limited budgetary and staffing
resources of FSA and second, overall policy level discussion about mainstreaming distinct credit
mechanism of part-time, full-time, and beginning farmers (Dodson and Ahrendsen, 2017).
Small farmers do not have sufficient internal capital to fund their farm operations due to lim-
ited resources at their disposal. Access to sufficient credit is important for their farm operations
(Dicken, 2007). Typically, a small share of small operations use debt to finance their operations,
and the share of farms using structured farm debt increases with farm size (Harris et al., 2009).
However, the overall demand for loans by small farms is increasing over the years as U.S. agri-
culture is characterized by a large number of small farms. Credit constraints have direct as well as
indirect impact on farm productivity and efficiency. Directly, credit constraints can affect the
farmer’s purchasing power to buy inputs, fund operating expenditures in the short run as well
as farm related investments decisions in the long run. Indirectly, it can affect the risk behaviors
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of farmers, which also influences the farmer’s technology choice and adoption (Boucher,
Guirkinger, and Trivelli, 2009; Eswaran and Kotwal, 1990). According to Binswanger and
Deininger (1997), an imbalanced circulation of initial capital in the presence of imperfect financial
markets with difficulty in credit access, specifically in immature credit markets, can prevent small
farmers from making productive decisions and investments; the credit constrained farmer is more
likely to invest in less risky and less productive rather than in riskier and more productive tech-
nologies (Dercon, 1996). This type of risk behavior limits the farmer’s work and efforts from get-
ting the optimum conceivable output. Moreover, the impact of credit constraints on productivity
is well documented in the literature (e.g., Barry and Robinson, 2001; Blancard et al., 2006; Färe,
Grosskopf, and Lee, 1990; Lee and Chambers, 1986; Petrick, 2005).
Although there are previous studies on credit access, impact, and efficiency, an updated review of
rural agricultural finance and studies about the credit role, constraint, and actual impact on financial
performance are limited, specific to small farms. There are no recent studies adequately addressing
these aspects in Tennessee, which ranks 32nd among the states in the United States for total agri-
cultural production and is listed as one of the economically competitive states in the country. In this
study, we use small farms in Tennessee as an example to examine these issues using a primary sur-
vey. We have defined small farms as those operations with less than $350,000 gross farm income,
following farm typology definitions of the Economic Research Services (ERS, USDA).
Agriculture in Tennessee is dominated by small farms having less than $350,000 gross annual
farm income. Tennessee has around 69,983 farm operations with 10,900,000 acres of farm oper-
ated lands (Census of Agriculture, 2017). Tennessee has a strong crop, livestock, and poultry based
agricultural production that contributes to the state’s economy: In 2017, Tennessee’s soybean,
corn, wheat, and tobacco brought around $1,385 million in cash receipts, while broiler poultry
and hay brought $443.9 million and $130.7 million cash receipts, respectively (Census of
Agriculture, 2017). Small farms contribute to the state’s total production of agricultural commod-
ities such as soybean, hay, broiler poultry, goats, hogs, cotton, and tobacco, as well as on the
production of fresh marketable fruits and vegetables. Tennessee ranks third in the nation for
fresh-market tomatoes and fourth in the nation for meat goat production (Tennessee Farm
Bureau, 2019), predominantly produced by small farms. Noting the above statistics, it is evident
how important small farmers are to Tennessee’s economy as well as to the United States indirectly.
However, 66,406 male and 26,054 female principal operators of 69,983 farm operations in
Tennessee make on average of $10,911 net cash farm income per operation—in terms of net cash
farm income, only 3,798 operations indicated net annual gain of more than $50,000, while 1,293
operations indicated net annual loss of more than $50,000 (Census of Agriculture, 2017). While this
fact is noteworthy, several factors may contribute to the differences in performance of the farm
operations and operators, including demographic characteristics, farm size, technology adoption
and use, income and enterprise diversification, debt/asset structures, and access to capital market.
Using the primary survey data from small farmers in Tennessee, we investigate whether credit
constraint significantly affects financial performances. To examine this we: (a) assessed problems
related to credit and loans of small farms, (b) assessed factors influencing credit constraint and the
effect of each factor on the likelihood of the small farmer being credit constrained, and (c) esti-
mated the impact of credit constraint on financial performance. Credit constraint implies that
farmers either have access to partial credit or no credit access at all when credit is desired.
This study hypothesizes that being credit constrained affects financial performance of these farm-
ers as their capacity to fully fund resources for agriculture is limited, and they tend to use subop-
timal inputs. This affects their level of productivity and gross sales. We have used gross farm sales
as an indicator of financial performance in this study.
1.1. A review of current government policies in rural financing
The agricultural sector in the United States is characterized by a large number of small farms.
Rural farmers, both small and large, requiring finance for their agricultural activities rely on rural
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financial institutions. However, the rural capital market is characterized by imperfections, includ-
ing information asymmetries. The government intervenes in the agricultural capital market in
several ways by making available guarantees to banks for loans, establishing credit organizations
solely for agricultural purposes, and providing subsidies to farmers. The questions to be asked are:
Are these programs set up as a result of failure in the capital market or as a result of pressure from
people to provide subsidies for the agricultural sector? Do the policies resolve issues? Does it
induce market distortion? If it induces market distortion, how can these distortions be quantified
and do they have effect on efficiencies and incentives? In Section 1.1, we review agricultural
financing and government support in the United States.
One important government intervention in the credit sector is the creation of specialized agri-
cultural credit institutions such as the FCS, the FSA, and State Agricultural Development pro-
grams. The FSA provides finance to rural farmers through multiple loan programs and land
contract programs ranging from guaranteed loans to direct loans. The FSA provides microloans,
emergency loans, marketing assistance loans, farm storage facility loans, and rural youth loans for
youths between 10 to 20 years to start and manage income generating plans. FSA also provides
Noninsured Crop Disaster Assistance Program (NAP) for producers of non-insurable crops that
do not qualify for federal crop insurance, which is a risk management tool intended to reduce
financial losses in situations when natural disasters lead to a loss of production or prevent plant-
ing. In the currently defined plan, NAP covers losses exceeding 50% of projected production and
55% of average market price; up to 65% of projected production and 100% of average market price
(USDA/ERS, 2017). FCS loan funds directly to individuals to purchase land and farm equipment,
as well as for operations and insurance purpose (FCS, 2016). FSA’s guaranteed and direct loans are
aimed to provide loans for different segments of loan borrowers. Guaranteed loan somehow
ensures conventional agricultural lenders such as commercial banks to entice them to underwrite
riskier borrowers. However, it also has the mechanism to directly underwrite loans. FSA direct
loans are primarily targeted at beginning farmers and small farmers with limited resources,
including some portfolios to serve socially disadvantaged farmers, emergency loans, and economic
emergency loans. Moreover, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) insured institutions
(commercial banks, savings associations, etc.) also provide agricultural loans. Looking at the
recent composition of farm income and wealth statistics presented by the USDA, ERS (Farm
Sector Balance Sheet, 2019), FDIC-insured institutions and FCS, each make up around
40–41% of all agricultural lending, the FCA makes around 3%, and the rest (15–16%) is by other
institutions (such as life insurance companies, credit unions, and Farmer Mac, etc.).
2. Conceptual and theoretical model
Figure 1 explains the conceptual model defining credit constrained farmers. This conceptual dia-
gram is adapted from Ali, Deininger, and Duponchel (2014). Figure 1 conceptually shows that an
unconstrained farmer is one who applied for a loan, received the total amount applied and desired,
and was satisfied. However, farmers can fall into capital (credit) constraint in several ways. The
first scenario is that a farmer can apply for a loan and either get rejected or get partial approval.
This implies that the quantity of the loan was rationed (quantity rationed). Hence, a farmer who
did not receive the applied loan at all and a farmer who wanted more loan but did not receive as
much as expected, are both credit constrained. The second scenario of credit constraint is that the
farmer applied for a loan of a certain amount and was approved, but he/she would have liked to
borrowmore. The farmer did not ask/apply as desired due to factors such as high interest rate, lack
of collateral, fear of losing collateral, fear of being rejected, and/or already too far in debt. The third
scenario of being credit constrained is the farmer who did not apply for a loan but would have
liked to. The farmer did not apply due to factors such as high interest rate, lack of collateral, lack of
supplier, lack of information of where to apply, no bank account, not a member (in the case of a
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cooperative), fear of losing collateral, fear of being rejected, etc. In summary, a farmer can be credit
constrained due to price factor, risk factor, or transaction cost factor (Bethuel, 2018). Capturing
these different aspects in the credit constraint definition is important. Specifically, the second and
third scenario is in line with the essence of “discouraged borrowers” as referred to in Jappelli
(1990, footnote 2), who indicated that completely “omitting this group may lead to biased esti-
mates of the probability that consumers are credit constrained.” Therefore, we have tried to cap-
ture the essence of discouraged borrowers in our definition of credit constraint (our definition of
credit constraint variable is described in Section 5.1). Moreover, in the discussion of credit markets
in the United States and consumers in general, Jappelli (1990) showed that both consumer and
lender characteristics1 determine the probability of credit rationing.
The theoretical framework presented below and used in this study links farmer’s credit access
with farm performance. This model conceptualizes that the receipt of credit enhances the net rev-
enues attainable from resources and market prospects, it derives the model via farmers’ maximi-
zation of utility of net revenue (NR). Productivity and efficiency differences among farmers can be
due to binding credit constraints. Following Khanal and Regmi (2018), assume a farm household
with existing land L and nonland variable inputs (such as labor, fertilizer, seed, and other) cap-
tured in X. The farm production function can be represented as f X; L; Zq where Zq is the vector
Why not?






















Interest rates too high
Lack of collateral
Fear of losing collateral





No need, household has enough resources
Interest rate too high
Lack of collateral
Lack of supplier
Don’t know where to apply
No bank account
Not a member
Fear of losing collateral
Fear of being rejected





Figure 1. Showing the conceptual framework of credit constraint.
Source: Ali, Deininger, and Duponchel (2014).
1We reviewed the factors used in Jappelli (1990)’s empirical model dealing with general consumers in the credit market.
Our empirical model includes some factors discussed in Jappelli’s model while leaving others because we are limited by the
availability of variables in our primary survey data typically constrained by assessment of assets as faced by low or no response
on information asked on farm household’s assets and wealth related questions; we have used a land acreage holding variable,
one of the important components of asset/wealth of a farm household.
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of production shifters. Assuming p and w are the market price per unit for output and inputs,
respectively, the farm’s NR can be represented as:
NR  pf X; L; zq   wX (1)
Let us assume that the farm has some income level Y at the beginning of the process of pro-
duction. The farmer allocates C for consumption with unit price, p. If Y ≥ pC  wX, then the
farmer can self-finance consumption and production events and is able to get a maximal NR level
without using external financial resources. However, in most circumstances, farmers have the abil-
ity to pay only a fraction of production and consumption expenditures from their own income.2
Assume that the farmer is able to pay only fraction s, with 0 < s < 1 of variable inputs. Then
the (1 − s) portion of variable inputs should come from outside financing—typically loaned from
either formal or informal lenders. Lenders will determine the credit, K, to grant to the farmer
charging the interest rate on the requested loan. Under these circumstances and the model
assumptions, the farmer’s problem is to maximize the utility of profit U(NR) as follows:
Max U NR X    U pf X;A; zq   swX  1 s wX  (2)
Subject to:
1  s wX ≤ K zc; zq   Y  pC  swX  (3)
0 ≤ K zc; zq  ≤ ρA (4)
The equations show that the expenses on variable inputs X are restricted by the farmer’s initial
income Y, consumption expenditures pC, and the credit limit, K zc; zq . The maximal quantity of
credit available to the farmer can be determined by both production characteristics, zq, as well as
consumption shifters, zc (factors influencing consumption such as household size, financial condi-
tion, and wealth). Additionally, equation (4) shows that the farmer’s credit limit constraint is deter-
mined by the value of asset owned (A having unit price ρ). The optimality condition for this is
obtained by first order conditions. As derived and shown in Khanal and Regmi (2018) under
the binding credit constraint condition, a lower optimal level of input demanded by the farmers
implies a higher credit constraint—a sub-optimal production leading to sub-optimal financial
performance.
3. Econometric framework
Consistent with our theoretical and conceptual model, we used econometric methods to empiri-
cally test the hypotheses and estimate: (a) the relationship of credit constraint with a set of socio-
economic and demographic variables including access to information and perceived risk of the
farm and marginal likelihood of being credit constrained, and (b) the impact of credit constraint
on financial performance. To accomplish these, we used: (a) probit model where credit constraint
is the dependent variable with different factors influencing credit constraint, and (b) the propen-
sity score matching (PSM) estimator to approximate and quantify the impact of credit constraint
on financial performance of small farms.
3.1. Probit model
Our model to estimate determinants of credit constraint in multiple regression frameworks can be
shown in generic form as:
y  f X1;X2;X3;X4 . . . . . . . . .Xn ; (5)
2Specifically, the U.S. commercial family farm households not under production contracts are shown to have lower income
but higher assets and tend to fund operations through a combination of income and working capital (including financial assets
and inventories). However, for the simplicity and generality in our theoretical conceptual model, we maintain household
consumption and farm operational expenditures met by proportion of income Y.
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where the dependent variable y is the credit constraint and X1;X2;X3;X4 . . . . . . . . .Xn represents a
set of independent variables influencing the farmer’s likelihood of being credit constrained. Credit
constraint is a binary variable having the value 1 if credit constrained and 0 if not. Due to the
nature of the dependent variable, a nonlinear model is appropriate to estimate the relationship.
The most widely used methods are probit and logit as these methods effectively transform the
regression model so that the fitted values and estimated probabilities lie between (0, 1) interval
(Gujarati, 2009). The logit and probit are comparatively the same in most applications, the key
difference between the two is due to the nature of their distribution, which is accounted for by the
Cumulative Distribution Function (CDF). Probit takes a normal distribution, while logit has a
logistic (slightly flatter tails) distribution. The choice of probit versus logit regression depends,
therefore, chiefly on the distribution assumption one makes. Following the majority of agricultural
economic studies, we assume standard normal distribution of the error term and choose probit
method to estimate our model and compute marginal effects. Probit is a nonlinear model esti-
mated using the maximum likelihood method (for detail, see, e.g., Gujarati, 2009). The marginal
effect is defined as the effect a unit change in each independent variable (x) used in the study
has on being credit constrained which is the outcome variable (y). In generic terms, Marginal





 βj; x0β ; (6)
where βj is the coefficient on variable xj from probit regression and ; :  denotes the standard
normal density.
3.2. Propensity score matching estimator
The PSM estimator estimates the effect of treatment that is given to a group in the presence of a
counterfactual control group. The mean or mean-based estimates such as OLS provide a biased
and inconsistent estimate if there is the presence of selection bias. In our case, we need to account
for selection bias because assigning the surevy respondent to the treatment (credit constraint) is
not random and credit constrained farmers are likely to have characteristically different from
unconstrained (Briggeman, Towe, and Morehart, 2009). PSM is suggested as an appropriate
method (Abadie and Imbens, 2002; Abadie and Imbens, 2011) to compute more accurate impacts
controlling for selection bias in nonexperimental settings (Abadie et al., 2004; Abadie and Imbens,
2011; Dehejia andWahba, 2002; Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1984). PSM has been increasingly used in
recent agricultural economics studies aiming to estimate causal effects using cross-sectional data
(Briggeman, Towe, and Morehart, 2009; Joo, Khanal, and Mishra, 2014; Khanal and Mishra, 2016;
Khanal, Mishra, and Koirala, 2015; Mendola 2007; Sitienei, Mishra, and Khanal, 2016; Verhofstadt
and Maertens, 2014). PSM is based on balancing the distribution of observed attributes3 of credit
constrained and credit unconstrained farmers and computing difference after matching based on
observed attributes—discovers a counterfactual or matching propensity based on the set of cova-
riates. Since similar groups are formed conditional on their basic characteristics, PSM assumes that
the only factor that causes the performance difference between treatment and control counterfactual
group after matching is the treatment variable, referred to as the assumption of “ignorability,” “selec-
tion on observables,” or “unconfoundness” (Briggeman, Towe, and Morehart, 2009; Imbens, 2004;
Uematsu andMishra, 2012). Although we cannot directly test this assumption, empirical studies test
the balancing between observed distribution of covariates across treatment and control groups after
matching to ensure no systematic differences between distributions and to examine overlap
3Since PSM is based entirely on observed attributes, a general limitation is that PSMmay have biased results in the presence
of certain unobserved variables affecting both treatment (credit constraint) and outcome variables.
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(common support) of covariates. The balancing property can also be tested with mean absolute
standard bias (MASB) between credit constrained and unconstrained farmers (Rosenbaum and
Rubin, 1985). A MASB below 20% is generally suggested to qualify the matching process.
Additionally, pseudo R2 and P values of likelihood ratio of joint insignificance from logit/probit
models before and after matching can be evaluated for matching quality (Sianesi, 2004).
PSM is applied in two steps: the first step is that a probit model is estimated with the binary
treatment variable (credit constrained or unconstrained status of farmers). Starting with this first
stage of regression, the PSM evaluates the propensity scores of each observation. The propensity
score of each farmer measures his or her tendency to be credit constrained. The magnitude of a
propensity score is between 0 to 1; the larger the score, the more likely the farmer is credit con-
strained. The second step, based on estimated propensity scores, two balanced groups are formed.
Note that the balancing is based on the likelihood of being credit constrained, as explained
through farm performance factors. Farmers in each group have like propensity scores. The
two groups can then be compared in regard to their performance based on several matching meth-
ods such as “nearest neighbor matching,” “radius based matching,” or “kernel based matching.”
The difference in the performance between the matched treated and control observations follows a
t-test for statistical significance. By calculating probabilities from a first-stage probit and then
forming the treatment and control groups based on these probabilities, PSM minimizes the selec-
tion bias that might have existed in the observed data.
4. Sampling procedure and data collection
Primary data were collected from Tennessee farmers through a structured questionnaire, which
was administered by sending a survey link via e-mail. An electronic survey method was chosen
because it is considered to be cost effective and quick to administer. Survey and personal interview
methods are expensive and slow (Dillman, Smyth, and Christian, 2009). To achieve a high-
response rate from online correspondences, e-mail reminders were sent three weeks after the sur-
vey was sent, followed by second and third reminders at two-week intervals after the first
reminder. In total, each farmer received at least three reminders and sometimes even more,
depending on their response time. This is in line with the study by Dillman (1991) that repeated
contacts often increase response rate.
Contact information for farmers are collected by extracting e-mail addresses and phone num-
bers obtained from the Pick Tennessee Products organization database.4 The Pick Tennessee
Products database has various categories of producers representing different agricultural enter-
prises such as fruits, vegetables, herbs and mushroom, honey, meats, poultry5 and eggs, dairy,
certified organic, as well as agritourism. The database included east, west, and middle regions
and was also further categorized based on counties in Tennessee. The total number of farmers’
e-mail addresses and contacts were extracted using a stratified random sampling method based on
counties, as well as different categories among the agricultural farms listed. In total, we sent the
survey to 720 farms: 250 to the east, 250 to the middle, and 220 to West Tennessee in 2017 and
received 104 responses. The questionnaire was pre-tested to evaluate the validity and clarity and to
evade repetitive questions by sending the questionnaire to a small subsample of contacts (those
not in the selected 720) in West Tennessee to observe their responses and modify some questions.
4Our stratified randomization is among the farms listed in the Pick Tennessee database. Although wemade an effort to have
a representative sample of Tennessee farms, we acknowledge and provide a cautionary note that some limitations regarding
representation may exist because picked farm operations were maintained in the database. Picked farm operations most likely
include operations directly or indirectly involved, participating in, or in contact with the Pick Tennessee mission of the
Tennessee Department of Agriculture.
5Broiler poultry production is generally under production contracts in Tennessee, typically for large commercial farms.
However, we cannot distinguish whether farms in our sample were operating under production contracts because a question
related to contracts was not asked in the questionnaire.
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5. Results and discussion
5.1. Descriptive statistics
Table 1 presents summary statistics of the dependent and independent variables used in this study.
The sample used for the analysis consisted of 100 observations, omitting 4 responses that indicated
>350,000 in gross farm income, from the 104 survey responses obtained. Variable description,
mean, standard deviation, minimum value, and maximum value are shown in Table 1.
Annual gross sales (or gross farm income from agricultural activities in farm types such as
those involved in agritourism) is measured in U.S. dollars. The annual mean gross sale in our
sample is $43,900 with a standard deviation of $55,316, which indicates that the majority of small
farms are very small (Table 1). A larger standard deviation also suggests that there is a wider range
of gross sales within the small farms. Further looking at the distribution of gross sale (gross
income) variable, our data shows that 92% of sampled households generate below $100,000 gross
sales while only 8% generate between $100,000 to $350,000. This indicates that Tennessee has a
vast majority of very small to moderately small farms within the categories of small farms. Mean
gross sales (incomes) in our sample is comparable with recent Tennessee Census data (Census of
Agriculture, 2017), which shows that the largest portion among farmers were dominated by very
small farmers—out of 69,983 operations, remarkably high 65,701 (93.8%) farm households gen-
erate farm sales below $100,000, followed by 1,639 (2.3%) generating $100,000 to $250,000; only
1,632 (2.3%) operations have farm sales above $500,000.
In our study, the credit constraint variable is represented as a dummy variable, where 1 implies
being credit constrained, and 0 implies not constrained. According to the conceptual framework
Table 1. Summary statistics of variables used in the study
Variable Variable Definitions Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Grosssale Annual gross sales from agricultural enterprises (including
agritourism incomes, if involved)
43,900 55,316.3 0 350,000
Cred_cons Whether farmer is credit constrained (=1 if constrained) 0.59 0.5 0 1
Age Age of principal operator (years) 53.29 10.38 34 68
Educ Education of principal operators (years) 14.06 2.79 5 18
Male Gender of principal operator (=1 if male) 0.68 0.47 0 1
LnHHinc Gross annual household income (in U.S. dollars, in log) 11.03 1.07 3.2 12.15
LnAcres Agricultural land acreage holdings (in log) 2.45 3.07 −1.38 6.68
Off-farm work Off-farm work participation (=1 if operator or spouse work
off-farm, off-farm hours/week> 0)
0.43 0.48 0 1
Smartphone Use of smart phone with internet access
(=1 if smartphone)
0.84 0.37 0 1
Continueplan Expected to continue farming in next 5–10 years
(=1 if continue plan)
0.85 0.36 0 1
Specialized =1 if operation gets more than 50% of agricultural
production from one enterprise
0.60 0.49 0 1
Cred_satisfied Familiarity and satisfaction level with existing ag loan
mechanism in Tennessee
1.22 0.89 0 2
Divers_score Agricultural enterprises diversification (score index) 2.35 1.23 0 9
Riskprcp Farming operation’s level of risk perception 3.1 1.18 0 5
Number of observations 100
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shown in Figure 1 and Bethuel (2018), a farmer can be credit constrained due to various reasons
such as quantity rationing, transaction cost rationing, or risk rationing. Quantity rationing con-
straints occur from both the demand and supply sides. On the demand side, this occurs when the
farmer is unable to make available quality and quantity of collateral required by the lender. On the
supply side, however, this issue arises as a result of the lenders’ unwillingness to increase interest
rates to clear out excess demand (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981). Given our primary survey data and
response and keeping the view from previous studies about multifaceted ways of credit constraint,
we defined credit constraint variable following a similar theme and somehow capturing the
essence of “discouraged” or hesitant (Jappelli, 1990) borrowers (farmers) in loan or lending mech-
anism. Specifically, we defined credit constraints in this study: (1) if the farmer indicated any dif-
ficulty in obtaining agriculture-related loans, (2) if indicated “not being able to get loans as
required or desired level for farm operation,” and (3) if the farmer indicated that she/he had
applied for agricultural loans and felt the following challenges or was hesitant to apply due to
any of the following challenges: (a) high interest rate, (b) complicated procedures and paperwork
to apply, (c) collateral requirements are problematic, (d) few institutions providing ag loans in
rural areas, (d) lack of established line of credit, (e) no loan provided due to uncertainty in agri-
culture, or (f) no information about where to get loans. From Table 1, our study shows that more
than half of our respondents (approximately 59%) are credit constrained, following this definition.
Figure 2 shows the breakdown of the response for each of these reasons of credit constraint. Credit
constrained farms consisted of 30% farms that applied for agricultural loans and faced some sort
of difficulties, 28% farms that did not obtain the loan as desired or required level, and around 42%
either hesitated to apply in the face of the challenges mentioned earlier or experienced these chal-
lenges considering application (Figure 2).
We collected information on some demographic and farm-specific characteristics of sampled
farm households. As shown in Table 1, our sampled farm households were dominated by male
operators (68%) with an average age of 53 and 14 years of education and had around $55,930 of
average annual household income. Around 43% of sampled farm household’s operator or spouse
were engaged in off-farm works. We have included farm land acreage holdings in our models as an
indicator of a farm asset. Farm land acreage holdings ranged from as low as 0.25 acres to as many
as one hundred acres of land, 60% of the farms had specialized production (more than 50% of
agricultural production coming from one agricultural enterprise), and 85% of farms plan to con-
tinue farming over the next 5 to 10 years. Looking at the types of specialized farms in our data, it
shows that fruits and nuts, poultry and egg, and vegetable dominated farms (with >50% share)
were the highest (each around 15%) followed by goat farms (5%).
Around 84% of sampled households used a smartphone with Internet access for their agricul-
tural activities. A large percentage of sampled households owned and used a smartphone with
Internet access, probably because 51% of principal operators in the survey were below 54 years
—relatively younger principal operators tend to use modern technologies. We also asked about
the respondent’s familiarity and satisfaction level with the existing agricultural lending mecha-
nism and the rural financing in Tennessee. An average of 1.22 on the 0 to 2 rating suggests that
the higher proportion of respondents indicated familiarity and satisfactory level.
Our enterprise diversity score variable indicates the number of enterprises adopted (with at
least 5% of agricultural production coming from each enterprise). The score ranged from 0 to
9, indicating that up to 9 enterprises were adopted by sampled farm households. A higher diver-
sification score implies higher agricultural enterprise diversification. On average, small farmers
adopted 2 agricultural enterprises. Finally, we included a variable related to “risk perception”
of the operation, by asking “considering your farm operation’s overall performance and chal-
lenges, how do you rate your operation’s level of risk?” The risk perception variable ranges on
a scale of very high (5), high (4), moderate (3), low (2), very low (1), and no (0). On average,
sampled households indicated a moderate level of risk perception with a mean value of 3.1
(Table 1).
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5.2. Results from econometric analyses and tests
We examined two research questions through econometric analyses: first, credit constraint and
factors influencing credit constraint and second, impact of credit constraint on financial perfor-
mance (gross sales).6
5.2.1. Probit regression results: Factors influencing credit constraint
Table 2 shows the probit regression result of the factors that determine small farmers’ likelihood of
being credit constrained. Overall, the model is significant as indicated by the chi-square statistic
value of 40.43 (P value 0.0001), and a good model fit indicated by pseudo R2 of 0.41. Particularly, a
Figure 2. Distribution of credit constrained small farm households by credit related response, Tennessee, 2017.
Source: Primary Survey.
6The first test we did is the two-sample t-test for mean comparison of gross sales, our financial performance indicator,
between credit constrained and unconstrained groups. The test suggests a statistically significant difference in gross sales
between these groups (mean gross sales for credit constrained households were $36,465, while those of credit unconstrained
were $54,167). However, the mean comparison cannot be interpreted as impact as it does not account and control for several
characteristic differences that are apparent between credit constrained and unconstrained farms. In Section 5.2.1, we present
results from the PSM estimator, which overcomes this limitation by appropriately computing impact.
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relatively higher 0.41 of pseudo R2 (for nonlinear models like probit) indicates a well explanatory
power of independent variables included in the model. We found that demographic, socioeco-
nomic, and farm-related variables, namely gender, off-farm work participation, land acreage hold-
ings, use of a smartphone with Internet access, specialized production, and level of satisfaction
with existing credit institutions in Tennessee significantly influenced credit constraint. The mag-
nitude of the relationship of each independent variable with dependent variables is computed and
presented as marginal effects. In other words, the marginal effect of the respective variable
presents the variable’s contribution on the likelihood of being credit constrained.
Our results in Table 2 show a significant gender effect on credit constraint. A negative coeffi-
cient and marginal effect of gender in Table 2 suggests that if the principal operator of the farm is
male, he is less likely to be credit constrained (5% level of significance). The magnitude of marginal
effect suggests that the likelihood of credit constraint is 0.31 points (31%) lower for male operators
as compared to female operators. This finding is consistent with previous studies that found a
positive impact for a male farmer to credit access as males are described to have more involvement
in farming, have a higher probability of owning resources such as land which can be used as col-
lateral in accessing loans (Bembridge, 1984; Dlova, Fraser, and Belete, 2004). Moreover, a signifi-
cantly negative coefficient of land acreage holding variable suggests that farm households with
large acreage holdings are less likely to be credit constrained. Farm land is an important asset
and the relationship is consistent with our expectation. Marginal effects show that the likelihood
of credit constraint decreases by 8% with additional acres of farm land holdings.
Another variable strikingly significant is the engagement in off-farm work. Operator or
spouse’s off-farm work participation decreases the likelihood of being credit constrained by
around 40%. The negative relationship is expected because off-farm work and generated income
is expected to provide farmers with quick liquid capital to offset their debt (Barrett, Reardon, and
Webb, 2001; Reardon, Crawford, and Kelly, 1994) making them less credit constrained.
Table 2. Results of probit regression and marginal effect of the determinants of credit constraint
Variables Coefficient Marginal Effect z/t-score P value
Age of primary operator −0.015 −0.005 −0.64 0.520
Education of primary operator −0.022 −0.008 −0.31 0.757
Gender of primary operator: Male −1.035** −0.310** −1.93 0.05
Household income, in log 0.311 0.107 1.16 0.247
Agricultural land acres −0.229* −0.079* −1.67 0.100
Off-farm work −1.153*** −0.398*** −2.58 0.010
Smartphone with internet access −1.191* −0.307* −1.78 0.076
Continuation plan 1.043 0.395 1.47 0.142
Specialized operation −0.862* −0.275* −1.73 0.083
Familiarity and satisfaction level −0.924*** −0.319*** −3.31 0.001
Ag enterprise diversity score 0.054 0.019 0.31 0.760
Risk perception −0.01 −0.067 −0.05 0.962
Constant 1.64 0.46 0.642
Overall model significance and model fit Pseudo R² 0.41
LR-chi-square (12) 40.43
Prob> chi-square: 0.0001
Note: Asterisks (*, **, and ***) denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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Additionally, a farmer’s off-farm work participation may improve the likelihood of loan repay-
ment because the farmer having off-farm income does not likely divert a loan meant for agricul-
tural activities to other purposes since those expenses will be taken care of by earnings from an off-
farm income (Ojiako and Ogbukwa, 2012). Additionally, we found that ownership of a smart-
phone with Internet access decreases the likelihood of being credit constrained (results are signifi-
cant at the 10% level). This is plausible because a farmer who uses a smartphone with Internet
access has the ability to track market and loan information. Farmers who use smartphones with
Internet access could obtain first-hand information about where and how to get a loan (Ayamga,
Sarpong, and Asuming-Brempong, 2006). Smartphone and Internet access enhance abilities to get
farm related news and information, better and quicker communication, and access to the market
that may reduce information asymmetry (Khanal and Mishra, 2016). Smartphones with Internet
allow use and access to social media and may help to engage as a customer of the bank community
and make arrangements for low-volume loans for disaggregated networks in the rural counties.
Also, our results suggest that specialized farm operations with more than 50% of agricultural
production from one enterprise are less likely credit constrained, as compared to other farm oper-
ations. One plausible reason is that farms with specialized operations have specific capital, equip-
ment, and production infrastructure and perhaps seem better in collateral ability for lenders.
Finally, consistent with our expectation, if a farm operator is familiar and satisfied with existing
rural financial institutions in Tennessee, the likelihood of being credit constrained decreases by
0.327 (32%), and this result is significant at 1% or higher levels.
5.2.2. Impact of credit constraint on financial performance: Propensity score matching estimator
results
We estimated the impact of credit constraint on financial performance using an appropriate PSM
method, as described in Section 3.2. The estimated impacts are presented in Table 3. PSM com-
putes impacts by creating appropriate counterfactual based on propensity scores and accounting
for self-selection bias. This way, it enables the computation of the appropriate impact due to treat-
ment (in our case, credit constraint) through measures such as average treatment effects for
treated (ATT). Propensity scores were computed using the same set of covariates as the probit
model. For the robustness of our findings, we used three different matching methods to compute
the ATT, namely, nearest neighborhood matching (NNM), radius based matching (RBM), and
kernel based matching (KBM). The matching procedure for each matching algorithm (NNM,
RBM, KBM) were tested for balancing property. Figure 3shows treated on-support, treated
off-support, and untreated regions. “Treated: On support” category includes credit constrained
farmers with suitable matching pairs, which indicates the overlapping of distribution of propensity
scores (common support) for credit constrained and unconstrained farmers. Observations in
common support regions have comparable propensity scores, which we use in PSM to create
a counterfactual group. Table A1 of the Appendix shows the covariate characteristics before
and after matching, which show a significant reduction in the selection bias (percentage bias)
in each covariate after matching. Mean of each covariate after matching between treated and con-
trol groups in mean comparison test is shown to be nonsignificant by P value—indicating the
treatment and counterfactual were alike after the match (Table A1). Additionally, pseudo R2
and P value of the likelihood ratio became statistically nonsignificant, indicating that there is
no difference in observed attributes for these subsamples after matching (Table A2). Low bias
values after matching, lower than the threshold of 20% for all matching algorithms (Rubin,
2008), indicates that the balancing property is satisfied.
7Since the survey has a 0 to 2 rating based on familiarity and satisfaction level for existing agricultural credit/loan mecha-
nism as one question, this coefficient is a combined effect of familiarity and satisfaction and hard to separate. We acknowledge
this limitation from the design of the question.
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In each estimation presented in Table 3, we found differences in financial performance between
credit constrained and their counterfactual counterparts—ATT estimates are significantly differ-
ent and can be attributed as the impact solely due to credit constraint. Our financial performance
measure, annual gross sales, of credit constrained farmers using NNM is $26,875, while that of
credit unconstrained farmers is $78,312.50 with a difference in annual gross sales of –$51,437.50.
The difference is statistically significant at the 1% level or higher. Using Radius Based Matching
(RBM), the annual gross sales of credit constrained farmers is $41,627.91, while that of credit
unconstrained farmers is $62,000 with a difference in annual gross sales of –$20,372—the differ-
ence is statistically significant at the 1% level or higher. Finally, using Kernel Based Matching
(KBM), the annual gross sales of credit constrained farmers is $27,109.19, while that of credit
unconstrained farmers is $76,976.71 with a difference in annual gross sales of –$49,867.52.
The difference is statistically significant at the 5% level or higher. These difference between treated
and control is average treatment effects considered as the impact attributable to credit constraint.
5.2.3. Constrained borrowing and the impact on financial performance
We further estimated specific impacts relating to different situations/reasons within credit con-
straint. Specifically, Figure 2 clearly shows two groups of credit constrained farmers that can be
referred to as “constrained borrowers”: (a) those who applied for agricultural loans but faced some
difficulty in the process (constrained borrowing 1), and (b) those who did not get agricultural loans
as required or desired level (constrained borrowing 2). We separately examined the impact of these
constrained borrowing on the financial performance. The estimated ATT impact are presented in
Table 4. Table 4 shows that the impact of constrained borrowing 1 on gross sales is not statistically
significant between the treated and control groups. However, the impact of constrained borrowing
2 is noticeable and statistically significant between treated and control groups. Our ATT estimates
on the impact of constrained borrowing 2 (Table 4 lower panel results based on NNM, RBM, and
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Figure 3. Common support and propensity scores for treated and untreated.
Notes: “Treated: On support” includes credit constrained farmers with suitable matching pairs. “Treated: Off support” includes credit
constrained farmers for whom algorithm could not find matching pairs.
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farmers can be attributable to the reason farmers not being able to receive agricultural loans as
required or desired level.
Overall summarizing our findings on impact, our ATT estimates from NNM, RBM, and KBM
suggest that farmers who are credit constrained have gross sales around $20,000 to $51,000, below
those who are credit unconstrained. Additionally, when further looking at the impact over specific
situations within credit constraint, we found that constrained borrowers not able to obtain agri-
cultural loans as required or desired level likely perform lower in gross sales—around $32,000 to
$39,000 lower, as compared to unconstrained farmers. Overall our finding is consistent and com-
parable with Briggeman, Towe, and Morehart (2009), who found that ATT matched estimates of
the impact of credit constraint on the value of farm sole proprietorship-production is around
–$39,658 using PSM Kernel-based matching. Using the same method, the estimated impact on
crop specific value of production of sole proprietorship was estimated around –$53,955.
Acknowledging the difference in the nature of nation-wide data of farm sole proprietorship of
Briggeman, Towe, and Morehart (2009) with our Tennessee specific small farm sample data, it
is reasonable to claim that our results are comparable.
Our results indicate that mitigating the credit constraints and improving access to credit to
credit-constrained small farmers and mitigating constrained borrowing by enabling agricultural
loan borrowers to obtain loans fully at their required or desired level could enable them to achieve
higher gross sales. Our impact results are consistent with our conceptual and theoretical model
that derives the role of access to capital on financial performance. Finally, our findings are in sup-
port with some previous empirical studies that depict effects of credit constraints or the role of
access to capital on farm household’s efficiency, productivity, production, or economic/financial
returns (Feder et al., 1990; Guirkinger and Boucher, 2008; Khanal and Regmi, 2018).
Table 3. Impact of credit constraint on financial performance (gross sales) of small farmers
Average Treatment Effects (ATT)
Method Treated (in $) Controls (in $) Difference (in $) t-stat
Nearest neighborhood matching (NNM) 26,875.00 78312.50 −51,437.50*** −2.60
Radius based matching (RBM) 41,627.91 62,000.00 −20,372.09*** −2.58
Kernel based matching (KBM) 27,109.19 76,976.71 −49,867.52** −2.41
Note: Asterisks (*, **, and ***) denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Table 4. Impact of different situations of credit constraint (constrained borrower situations) on financial
performance (gross sales) of small farmers
Average Treatment Effects (ATT)
Method Treated (in $) Controls (in $) Difference (in $) t-stat
Situation: Applied for agricultural loans, faced difficulty in the process (constrained borrowing 1)
Nearest neighborhood matching (NNM) 57,692.31 39,846.15 17,846.15 0.72
Radius based matching (RBM) 52,083.33 48,979.59 3,103.74 0.26
Kernel based matching (KBM) 55,357.14 37,661.06 17,696.08 0.77
Situation: Did not get agricultural loans as required or desired level (constrained borrowing 2)
Nearest neighborhood matching (NNM) 30,000 65,407.41 −35,407.41*** −2.42
Radius based matching (RBM) 29,655.20 63,409.09 −33,409.09*** −4.52
Kernel based matching (KBM) 29,821.43 69,013.42 −39,191.99*** −2.45
Note: Asterisks (*, **, and ***) denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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6. Discussion and conclusions
We estimated factors influencing credit constraint and the impact of credit constraint on financial
performance using an appropriate procedure based on the treatment effects method. To do so, we
collected primary data by administering a survey to small farm households in Tennessee, follow-
ing standard survey and sampling methods. Results from mean comparison and mean based esti-
mators cannot be interpreted as the sole impact due to credit constraint as these methods do not
account and control for several characteristic differences that are apparent between credit con-
strained and unconstrained farm households. To avoid this limitation, we used an innovative
PSM estimator in this study, which overcomes this limitation by appropriately accounting for
selection bias and heterogeneity. We computed impacts on financial performances (using gross
sales as an indicator) that are attributable due to credit constraints of small farm households.
Using probit regression, we found the significant effects of gender, off-farm work participation,
farm land acreage holdings, farm specialization/concentration, accessibility to a smartphone with
Internet access, and farmers’ satisfaction level about existing financing institutions in Tennessee
on farmer’s likelihood of credit constraint. Our results from the PSM estimator suggested that
financial performances of credit constrained small farmers were significantly lower than uncon-
strained small farms—that is attributed to an adverse impact of constrained capacity to credit and
capital and constrained borrowing.
The demand and use of credit by farmers is an effective tool in better financial performance.
There is a corresponding ripple effect with increases in farm household income to the local and
national economy if small farmers are able to improve their standard of living, increase disposable
income, and continue farm production. Based on our findings, some mechanism to ease the credit
access and lending process for agricultural loans for small farms irrespective of gender, land acre-
age holdings, and specialization help boost their financial performance. This study also found the
importance of Internet access and off-farm work participation in making farmers less credit con-
strained. Hence, extension agents should engage and encourage farmers to use tools such as
income diversification through off-farm jobs, and combating information asymmetry through
the use of the Internet and smartphones to mitigate the adverse effects of capital constraints
on financial performance. Additionally, inferences from our study also indicate that improving
the capacity and method of agricultural lending in rural institutions may enhance credit access
and financial performance of small farmers.
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Appendix









Age of primary operator 53 53.775 −7.8 40.1 0.832
Education of primary operator 13.75 13.713 1.3 77.5 0.975
Gender of primary operator: Male 0.813 0.837 −6.0 93.2 0.858
Household income, in log 11.115 11.097 1.8 92.8 0.928
Agricultural land acres 2.888 3.184 −12.5 67.1 0.615
Off-farm work 0.5 0.5 0.0 100.0 1.000
Smartphone with internet access 0.812 0.85 −10.1 71.7 0.786
Continuation plan 0.875 0.95 −19.6 −18.0 0.469
Specialized operation 0.625 0.625 0.0 100.0 1.000
Ag enterprise diversity score 2.562 2.737 −13.1 21.1 0.746
Risk perception 2.812 2.95 −13.0 5.7 0.722










Before matching 0.410 40.43 0.000 36.6 27.3
Nearest neighbor matching (NNM) 0.056 2.51 0.998 7.9 6.9
Kernel based matching (KBM) 0.049 2.20 0.999 8.8 6.8
Radius based matching (RBM) 0.120 2.69 0.997 15.3 18.1
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